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ABSTRACT Education students often expect that teacher education will teach them how
to 'manage' their students. This expectation is founded upon a notion that the
subjectivities of teacher and students are fixed and that it is, therefore, possible to 'know'
what the students are like. Using Louis Althusser's notion of 'interpellation' this paper
discusses how various theories of learning position teachers and students and can create
different kinds of students (and teachers). If teachers can learn to manage their own
thinking about the nature of their students, perhaps by learning a wide range of conceptual
systems, they can in fact call different kinds of student into being.
INTRODUCTION
I once saw my father, James Devine', a primary school teacher, 'catch' a boy of
nine or ten with a rock in his hand.
"I know you!" my father said. "You're that helpful boy from room "
"Six," the boy supplies.
"Your teacher was talking about you... now what did she say....you did
something very kind for her the other day....Miss....miss....what's her name?"
"Hopkir^. Miz Hopkins."
"She said you did something for her...now, what was it - I've forgotten just
what she said."
"I cleaned the board?"
By this time the rock has slipped to the ground. My father and the child have a
very pleasant conversation about what a good teacher Miss Hopkins is, and what
nice things she has said about X - who supplies his name so that my father can
report to Miss Hopkins what an interesting talk he has had with such an
appreciative pupil about her good work. By this time the boy is a model citizen,
who cannot wait to get into class to do more good work for that nice Miss Hopkins
who likes him so much. My father I am sure then reports to Miss Hopkins on all
the nice things that the child has said about her, and she undoubtedly then sees
herself as the only teacher in the world who really understands him and cannot
wait to get to do some more work with him.
INTERPELLATION AND GOVERNMENTALITY
Teacher education students come into class wanting to know how to 'manage' the
students they have before them but, as the story shows, the students they have
before them are actually not a static entity. They are to a significant degree a
' I would like to acknowledge here my debt to my father, Jim Devine, for his acuity
and knowledge in many facets of education including pedagogy. Jim taught in the
Waikato and Auckland regions for 30 years, and died shortly after this paper was
written.
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reflection of what the teacher sees or, perhaps more accurately, a reflection of the
reflection that the teacher shows the student.
Frantz Fanon draws attention to this phenomenon in Black skin, white masks
(Fanon, 1970). When a child cries out: 'Look Mama, see the Black man', he becomes
the black man, rather than the psychologist or whatever other 'identity' he might
have been in the habit of occupying. He is called into being, interpellated as Louis
Althusser (1984) names it, as a black man. From this point his recognition of
himself is altered.
The point of this notion of interpellation, for the purposes of this paper, is
that teachers have more power than they think they have. Beginning teachers tend
to see themselves as having a fixed character - a 'personality' - and their students
as having fixed characteristics - of gender, class, ethnicity, size, disposition,
behaviour and so on.
Teachers can alter the situation markedly by recognising the power they
have in calling a student to take up certain subject positions - as learner, as
manipulable pigeon, as citizen, as 'good' pupil or 'bad' pupil (or even worse, as
not a 'pupil' at all), as a sexed person, as a person of a specific culture, ethnicity,
colour (or as a person who is specifically not of a culture, ethnicity, colour) and so
on. The teacher is not an incursion into a room full of fixed identities but an active
agent in creating 'identity', or subjectivity, even at the same time as their own
teacher-subjectivity is worked upon by their students.
Education is at one and the same time about reproducing society, that is,
engendering conformity, and about producing the hitherto unproduced, the new,
the unspoken, critique, new paradigms, entrepreneurialism and so on. The
teacher's role in this is ceaselessly demanding. Not only must teachers model and
reward conformity, deliver the knowledge of yesterday so that the student can
take part in yesterday's economy ('get a job') but they must also prepare them for
the future - make them 'flexible', entrepreneurial, 'open-minded' - which is to say
that they must teach the possibility of thinking differently, even as they
indoctrinate their students into things-as-they-are. The teacher's role in
reproducing society is well examined in the Marxist literature, from Marx to
Bourdieu, and they do not miss the point that it is not the exact forms of society
that have to be reproduced, but the relations between members of society. This has
the result that, even as teachers endeavour to emancipate - often by teaching the
skills which will enable working class children to rise above their station as it were
- the world is shifting, and those skills will be required to enable those same
children to remain within their station. The teaching of skills is not in itself
emancipatory, there has to be something more. It may well be that the most
emancipatory activity of the teacher has less to do with the content of lessons and
more to do with the relations established, that is, the subjectivities and relations
between subjectivities which are the ethical business of teaching.
Judith Butler (1997) raises a question regarding Althusser's notion of
interpellation, by challenging whether or not a person would answer to the
interpellation if s/he did not already position themselves in such a way. If one
calls a man a 'witch' or a 'bitch', for example, the response is as likely to be
incomprehension as embarrassment or shame. It is most unlikely that he will take
on either of these subject positions as credible descriptions of himself - indeed, the
impossibility is possibly the reason for the popularity of 'son of a bitch'. But
perhaps this is because the person spoken to knows the discourse and knows that
there are certain characteristics about him which makes the interpellation
inappropriate, so he doesn't have to take it seriously. If a woman teacher, for
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instance, is called a 'witch' or a 'bitch' she knows very well that within a discourse
which is very familiar to her, these are available positions for her to take up, and
her response is likely to be very personal: whether accepting or rejecting her
notion of her self is called into question.
This is why Althusser positions these interpellations within ideology.
'Ideology' he defines as "a 'representation' of the imaginary relationship of
individuals to their real conditions of existence" (Althusser, 1984, p. 162). If the
ideology is completely uriknown - the representation is unrecognisable, there is no
imaginary or conceptual connection or the discourse amounts to a foreign
language - then interpellation will not work. There is no point in calling a child a
'linguist' just because he or she has a fair mastery of language: the term will be
meaningless and it will not alter her self-conception. Call her 'good at English',
however, and her world begins to change.
But Althusser's notion of ideology is not just about the accidents of teaching.
It is a very profound critique of the school as an agent of the reproduction of the
relations of society. The school is an 'ISA', an ideological state apparatus. It has a
role in rendering the child/subject governable, by causing the child to learn and
adopt all those things the state needs the individuals who comprise the state to
know.
The individual in question (who believes in an ideology) behaves in such a
way, adopts such and such a practical attitude and, what is more, participates in
certain regular practices which are those of the ideological apparatus on which
'depend' the ideas which he has in all consciousness freely chosen as a 'subject'.
The term ideology is not, in Althusser's hands, a word denoting merely
theory or some kind of abstract knowing. It is abundantly material: it embraces the
kind of practical experience and expression of a way of understanding the world
that is found in church through kneeling, praying and crossing oneself, and that is
found in schools through the technologies of assemblies, lines, rows of desks, rolls,
reports, unit standards, tests and so on. It is this lived experience of ideology
which constructs the subject, which is why 'performance' of the ideology is so
important. Foucault, who was Althusser's student, preferred the term 'theory' to
ideology, as less charged with disapproval, and gave the term 'governmentality'
(Foucault, 1991) to the notion of the rationality/mentality of government which is
(also) inculcated in the individual. And in education, from the student's point of
view, this performance happens more often in the classroom than elsewhere so it
is here that the performance of ideology and the subsequent construction of
subjectivity is most important (cf. Althusser, 1984, p. 157).
Despite significant reservations (Butler, 1997), which appear to arise from
resistance to the lack of autonomy implied by the notion of interpellation, Judith
Butler (1994) discusses a related idea in an interview for Radical Philosophy:
I begin with the Foucauldian premise that power works in part through
discourse and it works in part to produce and destabilise subjects. But
then, when one starts to think carefully about how discourse might be
said to produce a subject, it's clear that one's already talking about a
certain figure of trope of production. It is at this point that it's useful to
turn to the notion of performativity, and performative speech acts in
particular - understood as those speech acts that bring into being that
which they name. This is the moment in which the discourse becomes
productive in a fairly specific way. So what I'm trying to do is think
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about the performativity as that aspect of discourse that has the capacity to
produce what it names, (p. 33)
If we take on board Butler's project here, we would look at those aspects of a
teacher's discourse which have the capacity to produce what they name. And I
argue that the discourses/theories we have taught as 'learning theories' have
precisely that capacity. In teaching that this is how students learn, we have
encouraged teachers to produce students who do learn or who construct
themselves as learners and as people in precisely those ways which the theories
define. So that what is initially a 'description' of how the child learns becomes not
only a 'prescription' for getting them to learn but a description of the newly
developed subjectivity of the learner. A good example of this would be to take
Piaget's (1924, 1955) notion of the developmental stages: originally a descriptive
taxonomy, Piaget's stages now form the basis for deciding whether or not a child
is 'normal' (i.e., whether s/he ñts Piaget's descriptive norms), the curriculum
which should be applied to bring the child up to those norms if s/he has 'failed'
them and, most astonishing of all, provide a curriculum for people with brain
damage who are assumed to need to reprise the developmental steps of infants.
The original theory, performed by experts, has the effect of constructing persons in
particular ways. Those ways of course tend to support the 'rightness' of the
original theory. So it becomes impossible to test empirically whether or not the
theory 'works' better than another.
To Piaget, the child appears to be a litfle scientist (e.g., Piaget, 1974) and the
question is not so much 'how does the child learn?' but 'how much does he
know?' and a great deal of his research is devoted to finding out how much
children understand about the world, with certain normative and normalising
consequences following on from his conclusions as to what children understand at
certain stages and ages. He is interested in:
...the development of the intelligence itself - what the child learns by
himself, what none can teach him and he must discover alone ... this
development which takes time... he needs years to discover such a law.
(Piaget, 1974, p. 2)
Piaget's suggestions about the process of learning mirror Kuhn's theories about
the processes of scientific revolutions. Consequently, the Piagetian teacher can
provide the materials for reflection but not teach the processes of reflection or
learning. Obviously some children do better in this context than others; and a
comment made by Piaget might give us some indication as to how the child is
positioned as successful or unsuccessful scientist:
...there are certain subjects who inspire confidence right from the
beginning, who can be seen to reflect and cor\sider, and there are others
of whom one feels equally certain that they pay no heed to the
questions and orüy talk rubbish in their replies. (Piaget, 1929, p. 21)
This is harsh talk and while it might be - marginally - acceptable in a researcher it
is not at all acceptable in the teacher.
The teacher, however, is inescapably the vector of changing subjectivity. I say
inescapably because if the teacher decides not to use Piagetian theory, on the
grounds that s/he may cause a child to think of itself as abnormal, or not to use
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behaviour modification because s/he may turn a child into a trained mouse or a
pigeon, or not to use any other set of theoretical constructs which s/he has learned
in the course of teacher education, then s/he is reduced to using 'common sense',
that is, (to adapt Keynes just slightly) to using common understandings based on
the theories of people whose names and precise theoretical positior\s we no longer
remember and to which we do not apply rigorous critique. So the ethical problem
is not one which can be avoided by avoiding theory: it is one that the teacher
should engage with regardless of what theory, or group of theories, is to be used.
Nor is the teacher alone the source of interpellation. The classic research
done on New Zealand classroom interactions by Alison Jones in 1984 (Jones, 1991)
shows very clearly that students can interpellate the teacher, and call a certain
teacherly subjectivity or a way of being a teacher into existence, just as surely as a
teacher can summon a way of being a student into being. In Jones's study, classes
were divided on 'ability', that is to say, on the basis of class and ethnicity. Students
of high socio-economic status or those whose 'habitus', to use Bourdieu's phrase,
was compatible with that of the teacher and school system, were aware of the
importance of 'doing the work themselves' and developing a deep understanding
of concepts, sufficiently deep that they would be able to manipulate the concepts
themselves when needed, (i.e., in examinations). The teacher understood the terms
of this 'discourse' and there appeared to be little difficulty on the part of either
teacher or students in constructing acceptable forms of teacher and student
subjectivities. The lower socio-economic group believed that the archetypal 'good'
teacher exercised 'control' and gave notes, and they exercised a certain power over
their classroom teacher (through compliance and withdrawal of compliance) to
ensure that she fulfilled their expectations of the good teacher. Since the teacher
also believed that 'control' was a good thing and that 'control' was represented by
certain forms of behaviour - quietness, orderly sitting in rows and so forth - there
was enough common understanding of the discourse in both cases for the teacher
to be meaningfully interpellated by the class of lower socio-economic status into a
very disparate subject position from the one the higher SES class constructed for
their teacher. As Jones (1994) points out, the mutually satisfactory construction of
teacher and student subjectivities does not necessarily translate into effective
learning so there is an obligation for the teacher to take into account a wider range
of interpellative possibilities. Would it be possible for the teacher to encourage
these students of lower socio-economic status and - more importantly - of
different pedagogical traditions to see themselves differently as learners - and
therefore to allot the teacher a different role? Yes, but the trick is to put the horse
before the cart. Once students are encouraged to see themselves as having an
active role in relation to the material to be learnt, they will push and pull the
teacher into place.
SOME INFLUENTIAL THEORIES
Let us consider, then, how some of the theories in the New Zealand tradition tend
to construct the subject, both the student-subject and the teacher-subject.
Most of the theories which have been popular in New Zealand from time to
time have been thought of as scientific. That is, they have sought some kind of
legitimation as science. With this comes a kind of appeal to truth, to testing, to
consistency and to a way of knowing which is, by definition, universal or equally
applicable to all peoples, at all times. This scientific, universalising project arises
from the traditions of Western Humanism and its goal to replace God with Man,
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and to 'know' increasingly more about 'Man': the proper study of mankind is
Man, wrote Pope (1870), in unspoken opposition to the mediaeval notion that the
proper study of mankind was God. So all our competing theories of learning
position themselves as exclusive of the others. They are 'truth', and other ways of
thinking are mistaken. This puts teachers into a very difficult position. But it also
puts them into the very powerful position of being able to choose between
ideologies, and to use one to critique, support or undermine another. Teachers
have always been eclectic and fortunately now, in the shape of post-structuralist
writers like Deleuze and Guattari, they have theoretical support. Deleuze and
Guattari (2002) see knowledge not as a 'tree' with one stem, that is, with one
fundamental understanding from which branches/chapters/applications arise,
but as a rhizomatic form, in which subjects (people), forms of knowledge, events,
practices and beliefs can interrelate, create shoots and go off in various directions.
So it is possible to use Dewey, Applied Behaviour Analysis and Piaget or
Vygotsky in the same classroom without a blush. We are just being rhizomatic.
I do not intend to run through the whole range of theoretical positions
available to the teacher and student but will consider one or two - the reader will
then presumably be able to apply the technique to the theory du jour.
One of the most significant set of theories to affect teaching in New Zealand -
so significant that his name is almost forgotten although his techniques and
pedagogic principles have become almost the invisible underpinning of good
teaching in New Zealand especially in primary classrooms - is that of John
Dewey. Dewey was a philosopher and his interest in education comes quite
specifically out of his desire to establish democracy in the U.S. through the
medium of education, that is, to create the kind of democratic, inclusive and
coherent society which he believed to be desirable. In this case, the manipulation
of subjectivity was not a concealed purpose of a pedagogic programme - it was
the heart of it. So the Deweyan teacher would teach notions of equity and political
responsibility through the techniques of his classroom: through mock parliaments
and debates, through negotiated rules, through discussions of fairness and
modelling concern for others, through taking the child's interests seriously (this is
the realm of 'child-centred' education) and through developing the talents of
future citizens through motivation rather than through force. Because Dewey
believed that people learn through habit, that is, through every experience, and
that experience modified the person undergoing it, in order to produce good
democratic society, one has to produce people whose habits and experience are
democratic. So the teacher has to lead this future citizen into the full enjoyment of
his or her political rights while, at the same time, developing a healthy respect for
the rights of others by making them habitual, that is, by making them part of the
ongoing, ordinary life of the classroom (Dewey, 1938). The teacher is somewhat
ambiguously cast as judge and as the President/monarch in this classroon\ and
there is large potential for dispute when the teacher fails to be as democratic as her
citizen/subjects would like her to be. It is not a concept of pedagogy which
appeals to all peoples. Nor are all students happy to be called into existence as
political beings. Nonetheless, it is a history of which we need not be ashamed.
Another major tradition which has major implications in terms of subjectivity is
Applied Behaviour Analysis.
Applied Behaviour Analysis is an interesting theory which lays major claims
to scientific validity and is based on one of the oldest Enlightenment conceptions
of the subject: Hobbes's self-interested person, red in tooth and claw. Based on
studies of animals who respond to 'stimuli' (mainly food) by learning required
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behaviours. Applied Behaviour Analysis makes the conceptual leap from rat or
pigeon to Man without too much trouble. And it works. Man is indeed an animal
and what he has in common with these animals is an affection for food, and the
ability to make a conceptual link between performing certain behaviours (pressing
a key, running a maze, sitting up straight, getting work flnished) and rewards.
Food remains, despite the concerns of anti-junk foodists, the most effective
reinforcer.
So, how does this theory affect learner and teacher subjectivities? Students do
not learn to see themselves as pigeons but they do quickly realise that the game is
about reward and about performing tasks which are related exactly to what is
required. The Hobbesian (Hobbes, 1642/1983) concept of the self-interested
individual which lies at the heart of Behaviour Modification has a great deal in
common with the self-interested, atomized individual who lies at the heart of
Public Choice theory and other similar economistic theories about the way people
are and behave. Consequently, there is much likeness between the student as
constructed by Behaviour Modification and the teacher constructed by New Public
Management principles. This makes for 'consistency' throughout the system and
encourages the application of 'management' principles to the classroom and to the
management of teachers. But, in both cases, there is a problem in the self-limiting
nature of the concept. The teacher, or the employer or the government, depending
on whether the setting is that of the classroom or the staffroom, sets up the
description of what counts as behaviour to be rewarded. Knowledge does not
really come into the picture. The focus is on performance - 'emitting' the desired
forms of behaviour which merit the rewards. Like many other auditing systems
(benchmarking, appraisal, etc.) the emphasis is on a legalistic definition of 'work'
to be done. In part this is to make it less confusing, and to establish clearly a
connection between the behaviour and the reward, but the consequence is that of a
performer who expects nothing for initiative (unless 'initiative' is specifically
asked for, and it would be very hard to arrive at a scientific description) and
expects a great deal for conforming to expectations. It is not, therefore, surprising
that, as a set of techniques. Behaviour Modification tends to be used most for
'difficult' students, who are not seen as motivated by the rewards available to their
less difficult, more academically successful peers. The system is essentially
conformist and, as such, carries its own downfall. In terms of Foucault's notion of
'governmentality'. Applied Behaviour Management prepares students for lives of
submission and acceptance of goals and standards laid out for them by others -
the highest values are docility and governability. The 'ideology', in Althusser's
terminology, is one of physical compliance in which the self-interested individual
is called into existence as an anxious subject .of the will of others. Even Skinner,
who advocates the development of the 'science of behaviour' to solve all those
inconvenient problems brought about by human behaviour in relation to
technology (overcrowding, overpopulation, pollution, etc.), pauses briefly at the
problem of a completely determinist view of the human subject:
Who is to construct the controlling environment and to what end?
Autonomous man presumably controls himself in accordance with a
built-in set of values; he works for what he finds good. But what will
the putative controller find good, and will it be good for those he
controls? (Skinner, 1973, p. 22)
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Skinner does not answer his own questions, merely observing that "questions of
this sort are said ... to call for value judgments" (p. xxx). Unfortunately, teachers
cannot sidestep the issue so neatly. They live the practices which Skinner writes
about and have to live with the position they take up within them. The subject
position which these practices allocate to the teacher closely approximates that of
God. The teacher defines what is to be done and what the rewards or lack of
rewards or active punishments will be. The chaos of experience is to be brought
into order by instituting a consistent manipulator of causality - who is the teacher.
There are certain attractions to this role, undoubtedly, but beware! The world
doesn't really conform to this pattern even though generations of politicians,
businessmen and teachers have aspired to it. There are dangers to being held
responsible for the failure of the world to correspond to a kind of Calvinist
association of hard work with material success.
CONCLUSION
In the course of this paper I have, briefly, used Althusser's theory of
'interpellation' and Michel Foucault's concept of 'governmentality' to look at the
implications for the subject positioning of both students and teachers of various
educafional theories: Piagetian concepts; what we might call nineteenth century
missionary concepts, as in Alison Jones's 5Mason (Jones, 1991); Deweyist theory;
and Behaviour Modification. These theories by no means exhaust the possible
range of educational and learning theories which might have major implications
for the teacher and the student in terms of how they see themselves and are seen
by others but they serve as models for the process. The challenge is for teachers to
become aware, to the extent that they are able, of the theories they use in terms of
these effects and to deliberately choose, in an ethically conscious fashion, those
which will give the most productive results. Teaching, in this way, is not primarily
a set of skills - theories to be put into practice - but an ethical practice, of
discriminating among theorefical positions, all of which remain available, for the
best one to use, for each child, at different times. The wider the teacher's range, the
wider his or her ethical options are. This in itself is an argument for a form of
teacher education which does not focus on a 'best practice' (defined by whom?
judged by what criteria?) but embraces as best practice precisely a wide variety of
practices and an ethical consciousness of the implications of those practices.
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